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RECENT DECISIONS

It seems, therefore, that the objections to the use of the criminal
sections of the anti-trust laws against labor unions have no legal basis.
The remedy would be to apply to Congress for legislative changes in
and not to attack it on grounds of invalidity of the
the present law,
22
form of action.
A.A.
BANKRUPTCY-APPOINTMENT

OF

RECEIVER

AS

AN

AcT

oF

AcT.-The
appellant, having been adjudicated a bankrupt, seeks to set aside the
order of adjudication upon the ground that he has not committed any
act of bankruptcy. It was alleged in the involuntary petition that the
appellant and his partner, while engaged in the business of selling
securities to the public, permitted the appointment of a receiver. The
receiver was appointed after an action had been commenced by the
Attorney General in the Supreme Court in New York pursuant to the
provisions of the Martin Act.1 The appellant consented to the appointment. The complaint in that action alleged that the defendants had
intermingled their funds with those of their customers to such an
extent that the assets could not be identified in kind because of such
intermingling. The receiver was appointed to take possession of, administer, and liquidate so much of the defendants' property which
would be found to be acquired by means of such fraudulent practices
in the sale of securities. The appellant in his answer to the involuntary petition contended that this appointment did not constitute an act
of bankruptcy as defined by the Chandler amendments to the Bankruptcy Acts. 2 Held, the appointment of the receiver did not constitute
an act of bankruptcy, proceeding dismissed, order vacated. Elfast v.
Lamb, 111 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
The appointment of a receiver in an action pursuant to the provisions of the Martin Act 3 does not constitute an act of bankruptcy.
It is expressly stipulated in General Business Law, Section 353a,
among other things, that the judgment entered in an action pursuant
to the provisions of the aforementioned Act may provide that the
powers of the receiver are limited only to those assets which were
derived by means of fraudulent acts. This is exactly what had
occurred in this case. The order of appointment provided that the
receiver is directed to "take possession and title of the property and
22 See letter of Assistant Attorney-General Thurman Arnold to the Secretary of the Central Labor Union of Indianapolis, N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1939,
p. 1, col. 4, stating the liberal policy which will be pursued in respect to prosecution of labor unions under the Anti-trust Act.
IN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 353, 353a.
252 STAT. 844, 11 U. S. C. A. §21a(5) (1938): "Acts of bankruptcy by a
person shall consist of his having * ** (5) while insolvent or unable to pay his
debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of his property."
3 See note 1, supra.
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assets of every kind and nature of the * * * defendants, derived by
means-of fraudulent acts,,practices or transactions in the sate of securities *-* * and liquidate same or any part thereof for the benefit of all
persons * * * ".

From the language of the order it. is to be seen that

the powers of the appointed receiver were limited. The receivership,
which is contemplated by the Chandler Act 4 to constitute an act of
bankruptcy, is one where the powers of the receiver are unlimited and
general in their scope. There has to be a complete liquidation of all
the property of the bankrupt, and, in substance, should amount to a
general assignment of the assets.5
J. A. S.

CIVIL SERVICE-EXAMINATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REFEREE-AsSIGNMENT OF RELATIVE WEIGHT TO WRITTEN
EXAMINATION-ExCLUDING

LAWYER APPLICANTS WHO ARE NOT

GRADUATES OF LAW ScHoOLs.-Petitioners are lawyers who were

admitted to the Bar under rules authorized by statute' and rules
promulgated by the Court of Appeals.2 Each have had at least five
.years' experience in active practice. The State Industrial Commissi6ner was authorized to appoint "subject to the regulations of the
civil service" as many unemployment insurance referees as might be
necessary to perform the prescribed duties under the law.3 Accord-,
4 See note I supra.
5 Burns v. Maguire, 255 App. Div. 552, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 313 (lst Dept.
1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 700, 21 N. E. (2d) 203 (1939). An action brought by a
receiver appointed under the Martin Act (see note 1, mcpra) was dismissed
because the receiver failed to allege that the cause of action arose out of fraudulent practice; since the receiver was not a "general receiver"; he could not
maintain the action without such an allegation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of this case upon the authority of Goldberg, et al. v. Weiinian,
et at., 247 App. Div. 734, 277 N. Y. Supp. 657 (2d Dept. 1935), aff'd, 269 N. Y.
537, 199 N. E. 524 (1935).. Plaintiff in this case was appointed receiver pursuant to the Martin Act; he sued for an accounting and damages were alleged
to have been sustained through the mismanagement of the directors of the corporation. The court held that the acts complained of did not affect the property
of the corporation since such assets were derived by means of the fraudulent
practices denounced by the Act. Therefore plaintiff had no legal capacity to
sue. Hughes v. Ellenbogen, 256 App. Div. 1103, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 561 (2d
Dept. 1939) (the scope of the receivership, contemplated under the Martin Act,
is limited to such property as derived by means of fraudulent practices and does
not extend to general assets). See People v. Lother, 241 App. Div. 524, 273
N. Y. Supp. 669 (4th Dept. 1934).
1
S N. Y. JuD. LAW § 53.
2 N. Y. CT. OF App. RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTys. III, IV.

3
N. Y. LABOR LAW §§ 518 (6a), 530 '(The statutory duties of an unemployment insurance referee are defined as follows: "It shall be the duty of a
referee, under the supervision, direction and administrative control of the appeal
board, to hear and decide disputed claims for benefits, to hear and decide cases
arising under section five hundred twenty-three hereof and to conduct further
hearings in connection with the foregoing, as may be required by the appeal
board").

